The chapter assesses the Colombian peace process, as regulated by Law 975 of 2005 (Ley de Justicia y Paz), with a view to Colombia's obligations under Article 17 of the ICC Statute. After some preliminary remarks (infra 1), it gives an overview of the process under Law 975, taking into account not only the relevant norms, but, especially, the practice (2). In the second part, the complementarity test of Article 17 of the ICC Statute is systematically analysed and applied to the Colombian situation (3). First, the object of reference of this test, in particular the distinction between situation and case, will be examined. Then, the actual complementarity test will be analysed -distinguishing between complementarity stricto sensu on the one hand, and an additional gravity threshold on the other.
As to pending investigations or trials against members of irregular groups in general, Article 20 provides for their 'joinder' and the 'accumulation of sentences' if the respective offences have been committed 'during or on occasion of membership' in the respective group; 16 crimes committed before membership are excluded from Law 975, i.e., they must be dealt with exclusively by the ordinary criminal justice system. Thus, in case of conflict between the ordinary procedure and the Justice and Peace procedure with regard to the same crimes committed 'during and on occasion of membership', one must distinguish as follows: The ordinary criminal proceedings are temporarily suspended when these same crimes are the object of a (successive or partial) imputation under Law 975; they are definitely joined ('accumulated') with the Law 975 proceedings if the charges are confirmed ('legalized') by the Higher Tribunal's Justice and Peace Chamber. 17 In the case of a prior sentence for crimes committed 'during and on occasion of membership', this sentence shall be 'accumulated' with the sentence to be imposed under Law 975 according to the normal rules of cumulative sentencing (concours) under the Criminal Code. 18 In any case, while the 'accumulated' sentence can be higher than the alternative sentence, 19 the finally executed sentence will never go beyond the range of 5 to 8 years fixed by the alternative sentence. 
The process under Law 975
The process under Law 975 consists of an administrative and a judicial phase. 21 The latter can be divided in a 'pre-procedural' phase, directed by the General Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación), and a 'procedural' one, directed by the Higher Tribunal's special Justice and Peace Chambers (Salas de Justicia y Paz). 22 In a nutshell the procedure can be presented as follows: 16 See also Supreme Court, Judgment of 27 August 2007, Rad. 27873, section 2.1 ('Naturaleza jurídica y estructura del trámite previsto por la ley 975 de 2005'). 17 See Supreme Court, Judgment of 25 September 2007, Rad. 28250, Consideraciones de la Corte. On the confirmation of the charges see infra 2.2., note 40 and main text. 18 According to Art. 31 CP, in case of various offences, the gravest sentence will be increased but must not exceed 60 years. See for the applicability of these rules, Art. 460 of Law 906 of 2004 (current Código de Procedimiento Penal = Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter: 'CPP') and Art. 470 of Law 600 of 2000 ('former CPP'). 19 Constitutional Court, supra note 6, section 6.2.1.6.4 has declared the last part of paragraph 2 of Article 20 ('… but in no case may the alternative sentence be greater than that provided for in this law') unconstitutional. 20 Ibid. See for the first concrete application Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Judgement of 19 March 2009, Sala de Justicia y Paz, Rad. 11001600253200680526, Wilson Salazar Carrascal ('El Loro'), para. 164-166. 21 Cf., Supreme Court, supra note 16, section 2.1. ('Naturaleza jurídica y estructura del trámite previsto por la ley 975 de 2005'); see also Supreme Court, Judgement of 23 August 2007, Rad. 28040, ('Consideraciones de la Corte, cuestion previa, section 2') and Judgement of 25 September of 2007, Rad. 28040, ('Consideraciones de la Corte, Estructura del proceso de justicia y paz'). 22 The distinction between a 'pre-procedural' and a procedural phase stricto sensu is a particular feature of Colombian law and doctrine (see Supreme Court, supra note 16, section 2.1.) (Naturaleza jurídica y estructura del trámite previsto por la ley 975 de 2005). In contrast, in most other Latin American procedural systems it is understood -as in modern criminal procedure -that the criminal process starts with the notitia criminis, i.e. the knowledge of the prosecutorial authorities (police and/or prosecutor) that a crime has been committed. 
Administrative phase
The administrative phase starts with the demobilization, i.e., the 'individual or collective act of laying down arms and abandoning the irregular group' (Article 9). Apart from not being involved in drug trafficking (Article 10(5), 11(6)), the respective member must fulfill certain conditions, i.e., disarm, give up any criminal activity, surrender any goods from criminal activity and cooperate with the investigating authorities (Article 10, 11). Once the respective member of a group is recognized as such, the final list of 'postulated' members is sent to the General Prosecutor by the Ministry of the Interior and Justice. 23 With the then following preliminary investigation, the preprocedural phase of the judicial phase starts. 24 While the sending of the list ('postulation') normally implies the completion by the respective group members of the disarmament and demobilization phase, their reintegration into society will require more time and additional measures. The demobilized members shall receive certain economic assistance to that effect. Yet, the reintegration does not only depend on their conduct but also on the attitude of the communities where they should be received. For this reason it is highly important that these become actively involved in the process.
Clearly, the recognition of a person as a member of an irregular group and his postulation is the first filter in the process of Law 975. Thus, the question arises whether this decision as well as the exclu-sion of a person from the list is of administrative-political (executive) or judicial nature. The answer depends on the moment this decision is taken: As long as we are in the administrative phase of selecting the persons who may benefit from Law 975, the process is completely controlled by the government; once the judicial process is initiated, i.e., with the passing of the list of the demobilized members to the Prosecutor General, the Prosecutor and the competent Courts take over the process, i.e., it ceases to be purely executive and becomes strictly judicial. 25 While a voluntary and explicit renunciation of the postulated person leads to the automatic and irrevocable exclusion from Law 975, the exclusion for other reasons, i.e., due to the non-fulfillment of the eligibility requirements, must be decided -at the request of the Prosecutor -by the Higher Tribunal's Justice and Peace Chamber, composed of three judges. 26 
Judicial phase
Once the administrative phase with the listing of the possible beneficiaries is completed, the Prosecutor's 'Unit for Justice and Peace' (Unidad Nacional de Fiscalía para Justicia y Paz, 'UJP') starts, designing the so called 'methodological program', 27 a comprehensive investigation in order to determine, in a reasonable time 28 , the facts and circumstances necessary to establish criminal responsibility and the reparation for the victims. 29 In this so-called 'preliminary investigations before the free version' (actuaciones previas a la versión libre) phase, it is also possible to hold preliminary hearings in order to, for example, secure important evidence or adopt measures regarding victims' protection. 30 The competent Prosecutor then proceeds to receive the so-called 'free version'
(versión libre) 31 of the postulated GAOML member; it is preceded by his confirmation (ratificación) to submit to the procedure of the Law 975 32 . In the free version itself, the respective members of the irregular group must give a complete and true account (confesión completa y veraz) regarding 'time, manner and place' of all the criminal acts committed 'on occasion of their membership' in an irregular group. 33 The version consists of various phases or sessions which, in turn, may be structured in various sub-sessions or hearings which may take weeks or months. In case of giving incomplete or even false information the suspect will lose the right to the benefit of the 'pena alternativa'. 34 Further, he must list the objects and goods to be provided for the reparation of the Once the versión libre is finished, the prosecutor, with the assistance of the investigators of the judicial police (policía judicial), evaluates the information received by the potential beneficiary and determines the further investigatory steps to be taken. The objective of this so called 'programa metodológico' 36 is to verify the confession of the beneficiary and to possibly find out further relevant facts as to his responsibility and the criminal activities of his group. The program must be carried out in a reasonable time 37 and it is a prerequisite for the following phase of the 'formulation of the imputation' (formulación de imputación). 38 If the process of verification of the 'free version'
arrives at the conclusion that no crime has been committed, the investigation will immediately be ceased and the proceedings terminated (Article 27).
As soon as all possible crimes are established, the 'imputation' will be formulated (Article 18). It constitutes a procedural act by which the demobilized person becomes formally a defendant (imputado) 39 and the statute of limitation is interrupted. It takes place in a hearing before the judge of control of individual rights (magistrado de control de garantías) who must examine its formal and material legality. Another hearing for the formulation and admission of the charges (Article 19) is to be held before the judge of control not later than 120 days after the verification of the acts imputed to the beneficiary.
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It is important to note in this context that the Colombian jurisprudence has stressed on different occasions that the investigation of the acts confessed by the beneficiary and possibly further acts not (yet) confessed is a continuous task of the Prosecutor. It starts with the first verification after the free version and only finishes with the formulation of charges, i.e., runs through the whole judicial phase of the process from the start until the end. 41 In particular, it was held that the investigation does not terminate with the formulation of the imputation but must be continued until the formulation of charges. Immediately after having affirmed the legality of the charges the Chamber may, at the request of a party, set, within 5 days, a date for a reparation hearing (incidente de reparación integral, Article 23).
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Once the Chamber has confirmed the legality of the charges, a sentencing hearing shall be held within 10 days. The sentencing decision contains the main and accessory (ordinary) sentence (pena principal y accesoria) and the 'alternative' sentence; 43 it may also contain certain rules of conduct, reparation obligations and the confiscation of goods to make the reparation effective. It is important to recall that the alternative sentence suspends the whole ordinary sentence, i.e., not only its main part consisting of the term of imprisonment but also the accessory part which may for example im- pose an inhibition of exercise of public rights and functions. 44 Once the alternative sentence has been served (in an ordinary penitentiary!) 45 the convicted beneficiary will be on parole for a period of half of the alternative sentence. If he does not comply with the conditions imposed, the parole must be revoked and the convict must serve the ordinary sentence imposed. Ultimately, it is the Justice and Peace Chamber which grants and revokes the benefits of Law 975. In particular, it excludes a demobilized person from the legal regime of Law 975, e.g., if he commits crimes after his demobilization (Article 25).
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The complementarity test as applied to the Colombian situation
The short overview of the process under Law 975 has prepared the ground for a closer examination of the ICC Statute's complementarity test with regard to the the Colombian situation. As I have explained my understanding of the complementarity test in detail elsewhere, 47 I will limit myself here -after some preliminary remarks (infra 3.1.) -to indispensable conceptual considerations, and focus on the concrete application of the complementarity test to the Colombian situation. In doing so, I will distinguish between gravity (infra 3.2.) and complementarity stricto sensu (3.3.). Such a distinction is compelling if one considers, following the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber, 48 that gravity pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) ICC Statute constitutes an additional threshold different from complementarity stricto sensu pursuant to Article 17 (1)(a)-(c), (2) and (3) ICC Statute. This implies, in turn, that complementarity stricto sensu only becomes relevant if the respective case is of sufficient gravity in the first place. It therefore seems logical to examine gravity first and only then, if the gravity standard is satisfied, complementarity stricto sensu. 
Preliminary remarks
The complementarity test is an on-going process and may be revisited several times before the commencement of the trial. 50 The Kony Pre-Trial Chamber ('PTC') made the continuing nature of the test clear stressing the possibility of 'multiple determinations' of and 'multiple challenges' to admissibility in a given case. 51 From this follows that complementarity, being part of the admissibility of a situation, is to be examined at a very early stage during pre-trial proceedings, or, more exactly, during preliminary inquiries or the pre-investigation stage of the proceedings. In fact, once the 'Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division' ('JCCD') of the Office of the Prosecutor ('OTP') has affirmed the ICC's jurisdiction in all its aspects (ratione temporis, personae and 44 See supra note 4. 45 The Constitutional Court, supra note 6, section 6.2.3.3, correctly declared unconstitutional Art. 31 which reduced the alternative sentence by the time (max 18 months) the members of irregular groups stayed in the so called 'concentration zone' (zona de concentración, zona de ubicación), i.e., an area provided by the government for their retreat without any State control. 46 See supra note 26 with main text. 47 Ambos, supra note *, part II. , it has to analyze the complementarity issue. Only if a situation is considered admissible, will the Prosecutor be in a position to analyze more closely whether a formal investigation in the sense of Article 53 may be opened. 52 In fact, Article 53 itself requires a positive decision with regard to jurisdiction and admissibility before coming to the more policy-based and discretional criteria of subparagraph (c) of paragraphs 1 and 2. The Article 53 decision is at least as complex as the decision under Article 17 and the criteria to be applied, especially the 'interests of justice' test (Article 53(1)(c), (2) (c)), may even be considered more relevant with regard to the specific challenges posed by transitional justice processes. 53 This is especially true for the Colombian situation where it may well be possible that a situation or even a case may be considered admissible but, still, an investigation will not (formally) be opened for the reasons spelt out in Article 53(1) and/or (2). While this deserves a closer examination, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Article 17 and 53 explicitly only refer to (individual) 'cases' 54 -i.e., 'specific incidents during which one or more crimes … seems to have been committed by one or more identified suspects' 55 but it is clear that not cases but (general) 'situations' -'generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some cases personal parameters' 56 -are referred to the Prosecutor under the triggering procedure (Article 13). Accordingly, the procedural development from a situation to a case goes as follows: 57 (1) the OTP obtains notitia criminis; (2) starts pre-investigating; (3) identifies a situation; (4) checks the criteria enshrined in Article 53(1), 15(3), Rule 48 with regard to the situation as a whole; (5) starts a formal investigation (in the case of a referral), or asks for authorization of a formal investigation (in the case of information under Article 15) in the sense of Article 54; (6) investigates all-embracing and ideally identifies individual suspects; (7) ultimately applies for a warrant of arrest or summons to appear if the reasonable grounds standard of Article 58(1), (7) are met; and (8) the PTC issues a warrant of arrest or summons to appear.
Does the Colombian situation pass the gravity threshold?
Gravity has thus far largely been applied and defined by the OTP. Regulation 29 No. 2 of the OTP Regulations refers for the assessment of the gravity of 'situations' to 'various factors, including their scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact.' 58 As to the 'scale', the Office referred to the number of victims and also took the geographic and temporal scope of the crimes into account. 59 This approach has been criticized because of the difficulty in establishing exact victim numbers, the lack of qualitative criteria 60 and a proper methodology as to the objects of comparison. 61 With respect to the nature of the crimes, the OTP considers that all ICC crimes 'are crimes of concern to the international community and, as such, grave in themselves'. 62 Regarding the manner of the commission, the OTP refers to aspects of particular cruelty, crimes against particularly vulnerable victims and involving discrimination, abuse of de jure or de facto power, and, under certain circumstances, a so-called 'added factor', for example, if the crimes were apparently committed with the aim or consequence of increasing the vulnerability of the civilian population at large (through attacks on peacekeepers). 63 Last but not least, the impact criterion, albeit finally adopted by the Regulations, still seems to be controversial within the OTP, very much favored by the Chief Prosecutor 64 but not by (all) his staff members. 65 More importantly, it is not at all clear how impact is to be understood; it seems as if it is very close to 'social alarm' as employed by PTC I.
As to judicial pronouncements on gravity, the issue remains largely unsettled at the ICC level. Although the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber 66 proposed at least some abstract criteria regarding a casethe nature and social impact ('social alarm') of the crimes (systematic or large-scale?), the manner of commission (e.g. particular brutality or cruelty) and the status and role of the suspected perpetrators (are they the most responsible?) -these criteria have been widely criticized 67 and rejected by 72 The lower figure is from the government, the higher from NGOs, see internal displacement monitoring centre ('iDMC'), available at http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/CB6FF99A94F70AED802570A7004CEC41?OpenDocument. 73 
Complementarity stricto sensu
In the case of complementarity stricto sensu, it follows from the wording of Article 17(1) ('the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where …') that admissibility is presumed 78 and that this presumption may be refuted by -apart from insufficient gravity (Article 17(1)(d)) -some action on the part of the respective state with regard to its investigation and prosecution obligations (Article 17(1)(a)-(c)). Clearly, this action must be examined more closely with a view to the requirements established in Article 17(1) (a), (b) and (c) in connection with Article 20(3). Thus, the complementarity test stricto sensu may be structured in a threefold way: 79 • First, situations and cases are admissible if the state remains inactive (admissibility due to total state inaction, infra 3.3.1.);
• Second, if the State develops some activity, a case may be inadmissible pursuant to Article 17(1) (a)-(c) and 20(3) (inadmissibility due to state action, infra 3.3.2.);
• Third, as an exception to the inadmissibility mentioned before, despite or because of the State activity, unwillingness or inability on the part of the state is established pursuant to Article 17(2) and (3) (admissibility due to unwillingness or inability, infra 3.3.3.).
Admissibility due to total state inaction
The ICC Statute has reinforced the (pre-existing) general duty of states to investigate, prosecute and punish international core crimes with regard to the Statute crimes and to its state parties. 80 In the face of this obligation, inaction alone makes a situation or case admissible under Article 17. 81 The same conclusion can be drawn from an e contrario interpretation of 17(1)(a)-(c): if this provision requires, at a minimum, some action (initial investigative steps) 82 for a case to be declared inadmissible, no action whatsoever makes the case admissible without further ado. 83 Such 'uncontested admissibility' 84 , however, clearly does not exist if a state, like Colombia, sets up a functioning state machinery and a special procedure to deal with international crimes. Still, in such a case of lacking factual inaction, there could be normative inaction by way of normative (procedural) mechanisms which impede the initiation of proceedings at the outset (a priori inaction) or facilitate their irregular termination after some initial investigative steps (a posteriori inaction). 85 With regard to the Colombian situation, the extradition of top-level paramilitary commanders to the U.S.A. 86 and the application of the opportunity principle to low-level group members 87 raise the question of whether these mechanisms unduly limit or even undermine the duty to investigate and prosecute within the framework of Law 975. In other words, is it reasonable to argue that these mechanisms lead to the neutralization of the objectives of justice and peace and thus promote state inactivity in concrete and grave cases covered by Law 975? As to the extraditions, it is fair to say that while the access to the extradited commanders has become certainly more difficult and ultimately depends on the generosity of the U.S. authorities, 88 it is equally true that none of the commanders have formally been excluded from Law 975 and they are, in fact, more or less actively participating. It would thus be premature to argue that the extraditions have amounted to a state of inactivity towards the extradited paramilitaries. A different matter is, though, a possible lack of willingness or ability expressed by these extraditions. This will be discussed later. As to the opportunity principle it can clearly be said that its concrete application does not constitute an impediment for the investigation of international core crimes. First of all, the respective provision (Article 324(17), CCP) contains an explicit prohibition to apply the opportunity principle to serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law ('IHL'). Secondly, the application of the principle presupposes that there are no other pending investigations against the group member going beyond his membership and his sworn declaration to that effect. Admittedly, these safeguards can be bypassed in practice and only time will tell if the Prosecutor's Office, in charge of applying the principle, is able and willing to apply it in strict compliance with the letter and spirit of national and international law. In any case, it is important to note that the investigation against the respective persons can be reopened in case of non-compliance or lack of the legal requirements. Thus, taking into account all relevant factors, 89 it is fair to conclude that there exists neither a factual nor normative scenario of state inactivity. By distinguishing between investigation (Article 17(1)(a)), prosecution (Article 17(1)(b)) and trial (Article 17(1)(c) referring to Article 20(3)) Article 17 aims to cover all procedural stages from investigation to trial. The criteria are considered to be exhaustive. 91 The distinction in the various procedural stages corresponds to the different moment of application of possible exemptions from prosecution or punishment. An amnesty, for example, normally impedes a prosecution (subparagraph (b)) or even an investigation (subparagraph (a)), while a pardon is a typical post-conviction exemption only applicable after a trial (subparagraph (c)); 92 such a post-conviction measure can hardly constitute a ground for admissibility since it will be difficult to demonstrate that it was taken to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility (Article 17(1)(c) in connection with Article 20(3)(a)). . 90 For the same result, see Olásolo, supra note 53, at 282. 91 See, instead of many, Kleffner, supra note 56, at 104. 92 Ambos, supra note 10, at 74 (para. 39). 93 See also Stigen, supra note 10, at 334-35; Kleffner, supra note 56, at 266-67.
The provision presupposes some state action, 94 more concretely that the case is 'being investigated or prosecuted' (Article 17(1)(a)) and, if there is enough evidence, ultimately tried. The investigation and prosecution requirements must be read together 95 since, in any case, once an investigation is finished a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute must be taken. In other words, while an investigation in the sense of subparagraph (a) may block the intervention of the ICC for a certain period of time (namely, as long as the case is 'being investigated'), afterwards a decision in favor or against prosecution must be taken and in this precise moment, Article 17(1)(b) becomes applicable. In case of a decision in favour of prosecution, the decision-making authority shifts to the trial judge and Article 17(1)(c) becomes applicable.
While the trial requirement of subparagraph (c) poses little problem, it is controversial and crucial how (strictly) the terms 'investigations' and 'prosecutions' in subparagraphs (a) and (b) are to be interpreted. As to the investigation requirement, it is debatable whether a criminal investigation by the respective criminal justice organs is necessary or facultative. Even non-judicial forms of investigation, in particular a (effective) Truth and Reconciliation Commission ('TRC'), 96 would suffice. A systematic and teleological interpretation 97 suggests that, at a minimum, a systematic inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case, 98 the already mentioned initial or minimal investigative steps, 99 with a view to a criminal prosecution are required. This interpretation is also confirmed by the second requirement, the decision to prosecute. 100 Such a decision can only be taken if a substantial investigation of concrete acts and individual suspects has been carried out. In other words, a decision to prosecute presupposes a criminal or at least individualized investigation, which precedes and prepares it. 101 Clearly, prosecution refers to criminal prosecution 102 but not to the prosecution itself -only the 'decision' to prosecute is required. This presupposes that the organ that takes this decision must have at least two options, namely either to prosecute or not to prosecute. 103 There seems to be little doubt that the procedure under Law 975 complies with both the investigation/prosecution and trial requirements of Article 17. As shown above, Law 975 provides for a fullfledged criminal procedure whose main difference with the ordinary criminal procedure consists of its inquisitorial nature and reliance on the demobilised person's full confession as the starting point and basis of the subsequent verification procedure. On the basis of the factual findings emerging from the confession, and its subsequent verification, the charges will be formulated and the person concerned tried by the competent judges. In addition, it must not be overlooked that the special Justice and Peace procedure does not foreclose the possibility of subjecting the persons concerned to an ordinary procedure.
The application of the threefold complementarity stricto sensu test to the Colombian situation impressively demonstrates that the admissibility of a situation or case ultimately depends on the establishment of unwillingness (subparagraph 1(a)-(c) in connection with paragraph 2) or inability (subparagraph 1(a), (b) in connection with paragraph 3) on the part of the respective national justice system.
Unwillingness
Although unwillingness is not defined in the Statute, Article 17(2) spells out the criteria that have to be considered: (1) the purpose of shielding (subparagraph (a)), (2) unjustified delay (subpara. (b)), and (3) the lack of independence and impartiality (subparagraph (c)). The list is exhaustive 105 and is to be applied in the alternative ('one or more of the following'). 106 Yet, the existence of one of these criteria does not necessarily lead to a finding of unwillingness, the Court 'shall consider' them to determine unwillingness (Article 17(2)); thus, they are necessary but not sufficient factors to determine unwillingness. 107 In essence, unwillingness is determined by the underlying bad faith expressed in the actions or omissions of the respective national justice system. 108 The crucial point is whether the proceedings are not 'genuine', i.e., whether the deviation from a genuine proceeding is such that it must be considered as an expression of the state's bad faith and thus unwillingness. 109 While this implies strong value judgments with regard to the judicial system of a state in general and its treatment of international crimes in particular, the unwillingness test is not about passing moral judgments but about the quality of the proceedings, its seriousness and good-faith with a view to bringing the person to justice. It is worthwhile to point out that there may be legitimate reasons not to investigate, prosecute or convict -for example a lack of evidence, no public interest or policy considerations. 110 As to the Colombian situation, the analysis of (un)willingness must not only focus, in an isolated manner, on the three criteria mentioned in Article 17(2), but must put them in context, i.e., attempt to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the multiple efforts of the national authorities, taking into account the real and concrete context of the Colombian situation. As to the purpose of shielding, i.e., the State's intention, objective or desire to protect the individual responsible from (criminal) justice expressing the bad faith mentioned, 111 one has to assess the so-called 'alternative sentence' ranging between five and eight years. Can it be considered an expression of bad faith that ensues from a lack of willingness and thus, at least indirectly, a purpose of shielding? The Colombian Constitutional Court, 112 while admitting that the sentence may appear disproportionately low for the serious crimes in question, does not see a disproportionality with regard to the right to justice, given that the ordinary sentence is not replaced, but only suspended under certain conditions to be fulfilled by the beneficiary. Indeed, it is not to be expected that the judgments pursuant to Law 975 will be invalidated by the ICC; rather, more importance may be given -in the sense of a more com-prehensive restorative justice approach 113 -to the demobilized person' effective contribution to truth and reconciliation and his reintegration into society.
The criterion of unjustified delay can be evaluated from an absolute perspective by considering the time needed to investigate, prosecute and convict demobilized members under Law 975, or from a relative perspective by comparing the Law 975 with the ordinary criminal proceedings. A relative perspective faces the problem that reliable data on the duration of ordinary criminal proceedings, starting with the investigation and finishing with a first instance verdict, are not available. In absolute terms, the results so far produced by Law 975, more than four years after its entry into force, are, at first sight, disappointing since a judgment was delivered in only one case by the Higher Tribunal's Justice and Peace Chamber (19 March 2009), but even this single judgment has been annulled by the Supreme Court. 114 On the other hand, one must not overlook that more than 50.000 members of GAOML have demobilized since 2002, 115 almost 4.000 have been postulated, 1.926 of which have inititiated the free version procedure. 116 Thus, from this perspective, it is fair to say that progress in terms of demobilizations, investigations and confessions has been made but this is not (yet) reflected in the production of final judgments. Only time will tell if the considerable pre-trial progress will also bear fruit in this sense.
As to the third sub-criterion of independent and impartial proceedings, i.e., proceedings free from external (political) influence and bias of the judicial personnel itself, 117 it must first be noted that Law 975 was substantially changed by the Constitutional Court, especially by judgment C-370 of 2006, 118 calling, inter alia, for greater respect for the right to truth and reparation for the victims. Also, the Supreme Court's interpretation of Law 975 has been crucial for its application by the enforcement authorities and lower courts. Recently, it explicitly recognized the ICC's jurisdiction over the Statute crimes committed on Colombian territory 119 and even reserved its right to inform the ICC if Colombian institutions obstruct the efficient administration of justice.
120 Thus, despite the executive branch's quite 'flexible' approach to comply with these (and other) demands, the Higher Courts have demonstrated and maintained their independence vis-à-vis the executive power. Neither the interpretation nor the application has been (directly) influenced by the executive branch or other external actors to an extent that one could doubt the substantive independence of the judicial authorities. In fact, the current relationship between the executive (in particular the president) and the judiciary (in particular the Supreme Court) is characterized by a great tension which, according to some analysts, even amounts to an institutional crisis and impasse as far as joint decisions (e.g., the appointment of the new Chief prosecutor) are concerned. While the inability concept is more objective and factual than its counterpart of unwillingness, 122 its correct interpretation is still controversial. 123 Inability is determined by three disabling events: (1) a 'total' collapse, (2) a 'substantial' collapse, or (3) the 'unavailability' of the national judicial system. 124 The said events must entail the state's inability 125 'to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise (...) to carry out its proceedings.' (Article 17(3)). 126 A total collapse presupposes that the judicial system as a whole -not only temporarily or partiallydoes not function anymore. 127 In this sense, a total collapse may be equated with inaction as discussed above. 128 As to a substantial collapse, it is controversial whether the provision embraces a quantitative and/or qualitative assessment. 129 The collapse is 'substantial' if it has a great or significant impact on the functioning of the national justice system. 130 A geographically limited collapse may suffice, i.e., if the State's effective control does not extend to the whole territory but fails in some parts, 131 as, for example, in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. If, however, such a partial (substantial) collapse can be compensated by shifting the resources and proceedings to another venue, the threshold is not reached. 132 The determination of unavailability is more difficult, not least because it partly overlaps with the substantial collapse requirement. 133 A broad literal interpretation may reveal three potential facets: the non-existence of something, the non-accessibility of something, and the non-usefulness of a remedy, irrespective of its existence and accessibility. 134 Such a broad reading would also allow for including situations under unavailability where a legal system is generally in place but in concreto does not provide for effective judicial remedy or access to the courts ('human rights unavailability'), be it for political, legal or factual reasons (capacity overload), or is not able to produce the desired result (bring the responsible to justice). 135 A narrower view rejects such quality judgments about a national justice system. 136 Accordingly, one cannot demand more than 'some existent national infrastructure' and the fulfillment of some minimum international standards with a view to ensure the security for victims, witnesses, judges and defendants. 137 The correct view should find a middle ground between the broad and narrow interpretations. Thus, the existence of substantial legal or factual obstacles entailing a lack of effective remedies may only constitute unavailability if this qualification can be made by an external observer without entering into value (quality) judgments regarding the internal functioning of the national justice system concerned. The qualification must be based on objective (quantitative) factors which are easily verifiable from outside of the system, for example empirical information indicating that that there is no effective remedy for human rights violations. Under these circumstances it is possible that a capacity overload might render the judicial system unavailable, either due to the sheer magnitude of the crimes committed or due to a lack of personnel or other resources. 138 With regard to the Colombian situation and the complex institutional framework established pursuant to Law 975 (and its concrete functioning), 139 one can neither speak of a total nor substantial collapse of the national judicial system. Up to November 2009, the UJP has set up three main offices (in Bogotá, Medellín and Barranquilla) and additional satellite offices in 42 cities; it employed more than 680 officials. 140 The judicial authorities have, in theory, the possibility to carry out investigative activities in the whole territory of the country. Exhumations and victims' sessions have been realized in all departments, including the ones characterized by their difficult access due to the geographical situation or the presence of (new) illegal armed groups. 141 With regard to the unavailability test, the Colombian government proposes a restrictive reading, namely the clear absence of the necessary objective conditions to investigate and try a person. 142 The Constitutional Court further refers to the concrete examples mentioned in Article 17(3) ICC Statute (i.e., 'to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony'). 143 Obviously, if one follows this view, one can hardly speak of the unavailability of the Colombian national justice system given its general functioning. 144 This conclusion is confirmed by the advances, albeit small but real, in the prosecution of international crimes pursuant to the criminalization of IHL violations in Articles 135-164 of the Criminal Code of 2000 (Law 599). 145 However, a broader interpretation in the sense of the above mentioned human rights unavailability might lead to a different conclusion; arguing that the deficits in the application of Law 975, along with the enormous caseload and the lack of personal, financial and institutional resources, constitute a denial of an effective legal remedy and this entails the inability of the judicial system as a whole.
Conclusion
The compatibility of the Colombian peace process with the principle of complementarity ultimately depends on the unwillingness/inability test of Article 17(2) and (3) ICC Statute. This is also true for similar transitional justice processses which can be located, pursuant to the five scenarios of transitional justice developed elsewhere, 146 in the fourth group of 'measures that do not amount to full exemptions of criminal responsibility'. In such situations the (in)admissibility depends on the seriousness of the commitment (good faith) of the respective government and the judicial authorities, on the one hand, to achieve peace as the purpose of the (transition) process, and, on the other, to achieve justice for the victims. Justice in this sense is not limited to criminal, retributive justice but encompasses truth, reparation and reconciliation. The government's commitment can be evaluated by the comprehensiveness of the measures, i.e., if they are designed to apply to all groups involved in the conflict in an equal manner or if one group is excluded or (de facto) privileged, which would imply a verdict of unwillingness with regard to that group. This is not so much a legal-normative, but practical question.
As to the Colombian situation, at this moment, it seems rather difficult to plead unwillingness or inability to investigate and prosecute international crimes and, on this basis, to justify the ICC's (formal) intervention. One may come to a different conclusion with regard to concrete cases, though, in particular the cases against the most important, high-level commanders (including the extradited ones). Insofar, one may argue that Colombia has not done everything possible and necessary with regard to Article 17 ICC Statute, but this does not change the global evaluation defended here. To be sure, the deficits and problems of the Justice and Peace process must be resolved as soon as possible to avoid an intervention of the ICC. 147 The recourse to alternative justice mechanisms, in particular, an effective Truth Commission and (other) non-punitive sanctions, could help to overcome or at least mitigate some of the practical problems in the implementation of Law 975. 148 Without such mechanisms, it will be difficult to reconcile the demobilization process with the justice element of transitional justice. In particular, the establishment of an effective Truth Commission and a major commitment of the other institutions and entities involved in the process, would greatly help the Fiscalía to concentrate more exclusively on its actual task of criminal investigation and prosecution instead of assuming additional functions, especially with regard to victims' assistance. The design and implementation of reparation mechanisms going beyond the limited framework of criminal proceedings may help to facilitate an easier and less discriminatory access to reparations for victims. Finally, it should be recalled that the complementarity test is an ongoing process which may be revisited periodically, i.e., there may come a point where the ICC's Prosecutor is no longer content to maintain the Colombian situation under observation in the preliminary phase of proceedings and feels the need to go a step further and submit it to the Pre-Trial Chamber for further consideration pursuant to Article 15(3) ICC Statute.
